ACLED: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
UCDP: Uppsala Conflict Data Program
JNIM: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin
ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISSP: IS’ Sahel Province (Islamic State Sahel Province)
MSE: Multiple System Estimation
ADF: Allied Democratic Forces
UN: United Nations
Burkina Faso is a landlocked country located in West Africa, and which has become a focal point of conflict and instability in the Sahel region. Since 2015, it has witnessed a rise in violent extremism marked by the increasing influence of jihadist groups (International Crises Group , 2023) and a consistent rise in anti-French sentiments among the government and local population. This paper explores the complex relationship between these anti-French sentiments and the rising violent extremism with a specific focus on the violent incidents reported in 2023 by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). This paper provides a thorough analysis of these dynamics and provides a comprehensive analysis on the intersection between violence extremism and the growing level of anti-French sentiments in Burkina Faso.
The relationship between Burkina Faso and France gets its roots in the historical colonial rule that has left lasting impacts on the country. Following its colonization in the late 19th century, Burkina Faso then known as the Upper Volta experienced significant economic exploitation and social upheaval. The French imposed a system characterized by forced labor, resource extraction, and cultural erasure. These historical grievances continue to shape contemporary attitudes among the local populations towards France. After gaining independence in 1960, Burkina Faso maintained a complicated relationship with France. While the country sought to establish its sovereignty, France retained significant influence through economic ties and military agreements. This neocolonial relationship, often referred to as “FranceAfrique,” has led to widespread skepticism and resentment among the Burkinabe people, particularly in the context of recent military interventions. France’s military interventions, initially welcomed as an important support, have increasingly been viewed with skepticism and hostility by local populations, particularly as violence continues to rise. This sentiment is further fueled by historical grievances that resort from colonial rule and perceived neocolonial practices in post-colonial relations. Moreover, violent extremism in Burkina Faso also finds its origine in the regional instability, particularly the conflict in neighboring Mali. The rebellion by marginalized Tuaregs in 2012 and the subsequent rise of jihadist groups have contributed to a deteriorating security situation throughout the Sahel. Armed groups, including al-Qaeda and ISIS affiliates, have exploited local grievances, leading to increased violence and instability (Al Jazeera, 2022). The most prominent. jihadist group is Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), which has been responsible for numerous attacks against civilians and security forces in Burkina Faso. Consequently, Burkina Faso together with neighboring Mali and Niger demanded the withdrawal of French troops in the region as the leaders of these countries have viewed France as playing a neocolonial and imperial roles to escalate the conflict rather than contributing peace and security in the region (Guiffar, 2023).
In this section I provide a comparative analysis of both ACLED and UCDP reporting on these causalities and violent incidents in 2023. While this paper does not aim to provide a Multiple System Estimation (MSE) in this case study, it rather gives a critical analysis of these two news outlets and other background sources reporting the incidents of 2023 in Burkina Fasso and how the rise of anti-French sentiments intersects or influences violence extremism.
2023 has been one of the most violent years since the outbreak of the conflict in 2015. According to ACLED, there were 8 498 fatalities attributed to armed conflict and militant activities, marking a significant increase from previous years. UCDP on the other hand also recorded 6 109 fatalities in the same year. A significant proportion of the fatalities were civilians caught in crossfire or targeted by armed groups. Reports indicate that civilians are increasingly seen as collateral damage in the ongoing conflict while the Burkinabe military has suffered considerable losses, with many soldiers killed in ambushes and direct confrontations with jihadist groups. Fatalities among militant groups also reflect ongoing conflicts, although these are often less reported in mainstream media. Just as in many other conflict cases, UCDP and ACLED present a distinct approach in reporting incidents and fatalities in Burkina Faso in 2023.
UDCP mainly report the causalities under state-based violence. Out of 6 109 fatalities, UCDP reports that 4 608 were state-based violence and only 178 in non-state-based violence and 1 326 in One-sided violence. Based on UCDP’s reporting even for our previous group case study on Camerron Anglophone crisis, one can argue that most of the fatalities or violent events have always occurred in a state-based violence. On the other hand, ACLED reports a total number 8 498 fatalities in 2023, a number which is also higher compared to UCDP’s report. From this analysis one would ask, why does ACLED always present the highest number of causalities or incidents in every conflict? Are certain incidents under reported in UCDP’s reporting and why does UCDP classify the increments and causalities under a state-based violence?
Even though I do not provide clear answers to these questions in this paper, it is obvious to argue that ACLED data looks more credible in terms of the sources consulted, accuracy and relevance of the data than UCDP reporting. Many other sources consulted in this case study such as Human Rights Watch and International Crisis Group cited ACLED in most of their reports, yet I did not come across any news outlet that cites UCDP. In most conflict scenarios like the case of Burkina Faso, UCDP gives a general perspective of reporting focusing on the binary of side A as the State and side B as the armed group, factions or terrorist groups.
Nevertheless, it is crucial to mention that violent conflicts in fragile states are often complex with multiple actors usually acting in the background. For this reason, one cannot classify such a complex conflict under this binary lens as UCDP does but rather dig deep and analyze the dynamics of different actors, how they intervene in the conflict and the relationship they have with each other. In most conflicts, there are often factions that are more influential than others and directly influence the rest. In other cases for example, certain other groups would still commit crimes in the name of the major known faction even though the later does not have any affiliation to the group committing crimes, this situation was obvious in the case study discussed in class for the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where a bunch of other local people and factions continued perpetuating violence in the community in the name of ADF.
As mentioned earlier, the security situation in Burkina Faso continued to deteriorate in 2023, with the death toll from organized violence increasing for the fourth consecutive year. The change from 2022 was dramatic, with numbers increasing by as much as 135 %, from 2 600 to over 6100 fatalities. This escalation was driven by developments in both the state-based and one-sided categories of organized violence. Even though in this paper I focus on the 2023 incidents, it is important to mention that this conflict has been deadly and continued to deteriorate after 2023. For instance, Human Rights Watch (2024) reported ACLED’s data highlighting 6,000 civilians who died in conflict-related violence between January and August 2024 alone. Since 2016, over 2.3 million people have been forced to displace form their homes. 2.1 million people were displaced internally and over 200 000 to neighboring countries.
Burkina Faso’s military junta, which took power during a 2022 coup, cracked down on media, the political opposition, and dissent, contributing to the shrinking of civic space. In May 2023, Prime Minister Apollinaire Kyelem de Tambela announced the delay of elections scheduled for July 2024. On May 25, 2024, following nation-wide talks largely boycotted by the opposition, the junta informed that it would remain in power for another five years. Islamist armed groups killed 1,004 civilians in 259 attacks between January and August 2024, compared to 1,185 civilians in 413 attacks in the same period in 2023, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) (Watch, 2024; Zane, 2025).
The two 2022 coups, which were sparked by massive battle-field casualties, fell short of the new juntas’ ambitious declared objective of turning the tide of state-based warfare. Rather, the two conflicts in general and the government-JNIM fight, which was waged over government control, saw a significant increase in violence, which resulted in about 3 800 battle-related deaths in 2023. In addition to becoming more frequent and fatal, the violent conflicts also expanded geographically, wreaking chaos on formerly relatively unaffected areas, such the provinces of Boulgou and Koulpélogo in Centre Est, which border Ghana and Togo. Furthermore, the conflict between the government and IS’ Sahel Province (ISSP), which is centered in the country’s northeast, intensified throughout the year, doubling the number of fatalities from just over 400 to over 800. This further contributed to the rise in state-based violence (UCDP, 2023). The sharp rise in fatalities in 2023 compared to prior years suggests a deteriorating security environment. This increase in violence has been accompanied by a rise in anti-French sentiment as the administration and residents alike increasingly perceive foreign military actions as detrimental or ineffective.
Among the many factors that contribute to Anti-French sentiments include First, military presence and operations. The French military’s involvement in Operation Barkhane, aimed at combating terrorism in the Sahel, has been met with skepticism. Many Burkinabes feel that French forces prioritize their interests over those of the local population (Aina, 2023). Second, just as in many other post-colonial counties especially in the Sahel region, historical grievances constitute a great influence in the rise of anti- French sentiments in Burkina Faso. The historical context of colonialism contributes to a pervasive distrust of France. Many citizens perceive the current military presence as a continuation of neocolonial practices. Finally, the public perceptions of towards France has also deteriorated overtime as protests French influence have gained momentum, with demonstrators often chanting anti-French slogans and expressing a desire for greater sovereignty (Durmaz, 2022).
The intensity of anti-French feeling is demonstrated by recent demonstrations in Burkina Faso. The absence of protection and the alleged shortcomings of French military operations have angered protesters. Military leaders have taken use of this perception to justify their reign as defenders against neocolonial forces. More than half of all terrorism-related killings worldwide now occur in the Sahel, where violence is on the rise in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Russia and China are taking over as France leaves, changing the security dynamics of the area in the face of deteriorating Western relations and rising anti-colonial sentiment. For many years, France has been present in all its former Sahelian colonies. The deployment of troops around the region was part of Paris’ response to radicalism, but it was eventually hampered by regional resistance and tactical constraints Bielaus (2025). Paris attempted to utilize military force alone to handle the security issues facing the Sahel nations rather than attempting to pinpoint and treat the underlying causes of conflict by bolstering state institutions and promoting good governance. This military emphasis quickly shifted public sentiment against France and fueled the battle, even though it did not result in clear-cut triumphs on the ground (Aina, 2023).
The Sahel now contains five of the 10 nations most affected by terrorism worldwide. Sub-Saharan Africa was the scene of 17 of the 20 deadliest terrorist acts in 2024. The largest terrorist incident in the Sahel region was on June 11th in Burkina Faso, where JNIM militants killed at least 110 soldiers and 60 civilians while also abducting an unknown number of others (Bielaus, 2025). For the second year in a row, Burkina Faso was the nation most affected by terrorism in 2024. Additionally, this year was the third year in a row that the nation has seen more than 1,000 terrorism-related deaths. Apart from French troops who had been stationed there since 2009, Burkina Faso had little direct foreign interference before 2023. Captain Ibrahim Traore started establishing ties with Russia to provide military support after the second coup in September 2022, and in January 2023 he asked for the evacuation of French troops and its ambassador. A maximum of approximately 300 Russian private military men arrived in Ouagadougou in January 2024. The security situation in the nation hasn’t improved much, nevertheless (Bielaus, 2025).
The use of paternalism is the use of leverage or coercion by stronger states to influence the decision-making of weaker states in alignment with the former’s objectives and goals has also been present this conflict. The backlash to Western paternalism in the Sahel in recent years has largely played out in the worsening relationship between France and the region (Nzuki, 2024). “We’re forgetting one thing. It’s that much of the money in our wallets comes precisely from centuries of exploitation of Africa. Not only Africa. But a lot of it comes from the exploitation of Africa. So, we need to have a little common sense, a little justice, to give back to the Africans, I’d say, what we’ve taken from them. Especially as this is necessary, if we want to avoid the worst convulsions or difficulties, with the political consequences that this entails soon.” Former French President Jacques Chirac – 2008 cited by (Akrimi, 2023).
In addition, President Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso is still susceptible to some of the same factors that brought down his predecessors, such as conflicts within the military, and his authoritarian handling of the transition has drawn growing concern from both domestic and foreign observers. Even if it hasn’t become involved in conflicts with France or the UN or (at least not yet) embraced Russia to the same extent as Bamako, Ouagadougou has also had disagreements with them. Following fatal jihadist attacks on the army, Traoré’s two predecessors were overthrown. With at least five significant attacks on state forces in the Nord, Centre-Nord, Sahel, and Est regions between February and April, the military is currently experiencing its highest death toll since the start of the conflict. Thus, Traoré’s regime’s stability is still at risk from internal military rivalry. Like their colleagues in Mali, the transitional authorities in Burkina Faso have severed connections with France. In December 2022, they asked Paris to recall their ambassador, and in February 2023, they asked the French Operation Sabre to withdraw from the country. As of this writing, they have not entered a contract with the Wagner Group, and it is unclear whether they want to do so, despite having gotten closer to non-Western partners like Russia and Turkey (International Crises Group, 2023). The Burkinabe government faces difficult obstacles due to the escalating anti-French sentiment and the growing influence of armed organizations.
Burkina Faso’s conflict situation has undoubtedly intensified into one of the world’s most serious conflicts in recent years event though it has remained underreported. Once thought to be a peaceful Sahelian country, this West African country is currently plunged in conflict, with Islamist rebels dominating large areas, ethnic tensions rising, and humanitarian situations fast worsening. The complicated relationship between growing violent extremism and anti-French sentiments stays a complex case in Burkina Faso. The ACLED and UCDP data and other background sources explored in this case study make clear how urgently foreign military strategies can contribute to the escalation of the conflict in the country. Cosidering this growing anti- French sentiments in Burkina Faso and in the region, it would be difficult to predict whether getting rid of Frace in this region would bring peace and stability. It is evident that French has been pursuing its political and economic interests in this region but would the new allies such as Russia and China not pursue their own interests as well? Are certain allies more likely to hold win-win partnership in this region more than others in the face rising capitalism? whether Russia or China will or not influence development in the central Sahel especially in Burkina Faso, it is obvious that the level of collaboration with these new partners would only be successful and yield positive results if only leveraged properly by the leaders of these nations.
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