This paper explores the role of Transitional Justice (TJ) in fostering peacebuilding and conflict resolution in conflict torn societies with a focus on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). For decades, the RDC has experienced protracted violence, marked by human rights abuses and political instability. This study approaches the question of Transitional Justice with an exclusive examination of a few transitional justice mechanisms in the African context including Rwanda, South Africa, and Sierra Leone, their effectiveness, and the challenges they faced in addressing grievances and promoting reconciliation. Through the analysis of TC experiences in other conflict affected communities, this research aims to provide practical recommendations to enhance transitional justice initiatives in a way that contributes to an effective transitional justice process and sustainable peace in the DRC.
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been plagued by prolonged conflict and serious human rights violations, particularly in Ituri, South Kivu and North Kivu provinces. For the past three decades, this region has experienced political instability, civil wars, arbitrary killings, serious violations of human rights, such as sexual assault, forced displacement with 7 million people internally displaced living in precarious conditions, making the highest number in Africa (Amnesty International, 2023). Even today, the DRC is still a region of violence, with clashes between armed groups, extrajudicial killings, and tensions with neighboring countries (Ugwu, 2024). According to Human Rights Watch (2024), over 100 armed groups are active in eastern Congo, mainly in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu. The resurgence of the M23 rebellion in late 2021, with Rwanda’s support, has led to multiple armies intervening on Congolese soil.
This conflict has created an urgent need for transitional justice (TJ) mechanisms to address the consequences of these atrocities and facilitate peaceful conflict resolution. While there have been attempts to implement TJ processes in the DRC, including the Sovereign National Conference in the late 1980s and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission established in 2003, the Military Tribunals as well as the ongoing TJ processes, these TJ efforts have failed to successfully fulfill their missions (Mubiala, 2024). Hence, this research adopts a descriptive research design and employs a qualitative approach to gain an in-depth understanding of the use of TJ in addressing war crimes and human rights violations in DRC. Data collection methods involve the review of literature and document analysis. Therefore, this study provides a critical analysis of a few case studies on transitional justice in post-conflict societies in the African context such as in South Africa, Rwanda and in Sierra Leone and analyses how such processes can be implemented to contribute to conflict resolution and peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
This research employs a descriptive design with a qualitative approach. The data collection methods are literature review and document analysis. The relevant documents, include academic papers, reports, article journals, policy documents, and legal texts which are analyzed to understand the historical context of the conflict, previous transitional justice efforts and the challenges they face in other in other DRC, with the support of case studies from previous TJ experiences in Africa specially form Rwanda, South Africa and Sierra Leon. However, the inability to conduct interviews due to time and logistical constraints provide a limitation to this research. It would have been better to gather primary data from the concerned individuals on the ground and learn from their experiences with conflicts and TJ processes
Transitional justice (TJ) is the process of addressing past systematic abuses Merwe & Chelin (2020). Arnould & Parmentier (2017) also add that the practices of transitional justice include distinct judicial and non-judicial means under which communities address the past human right violations and violence. “Transitional justice refers to the process of dealing with human rights abuses committed during the course of ongoing conflict or repression, where such processes are established as a society aims to move toward a better state, and where a constitutive element of that better state includes democracy” (Murphy, 2020).
Sub-Saharan Africa has been regarded as a zone plagued by violent conflicts over the past century (Ani & Ojakorotu, 2021). These conflicts have presented complex challenges in finding sustainable solutions and addressing them effectively (Daudu & Dube, 2017). For instance, Angola experienced a thirty-year civil war that resulted in the death of over a million Angolans. Somalia, known today as a failed state, has been affected by rival warlords. Therefore, African countries with abundant natural resources, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sudan, have also been significantly impacted by conflicts (Udombana, 2003).
According to Le Mon (2007), most countries have relied on transitional justice to convict the many perpetrators to justice and contribute to reconciliation after experiencing war crimes and human right violations. Amnesty International (2002) also pointed out that peace is the primary need in post-conflict situations such as wars and Genocide. Thus, transitional justice policies assist political actors and enable citizens to “practice” essential elements of the ideal new democratic system. These policies can help create a more inclusive society that can serve as the foundation for a democratic government if they are applied effectively to address all relevant victims and perpetrators of the past (Merwe & Chelin, 2020). Some of the Transitional justice processes in Africa include; the South Africa-Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
In South Africa, the TRC was established in 1995 as a response to the apartheid era. It sought to promote national healing and reconciliation while addressing historical violations of human rights. Both offenders and victims had a forum to discuss their stories (truth telling). The approach placed a strong emphasis on stating the truth, making amends, and offering amnesty in exchange for complete transparency. Despite its drawbacks and critics, the TRC helped ensure a smooth transition and established the foundations for a democratic South Africa (Daudu & Dube, 2017). Rwanda also established the Gacaca Courts as a community-based transitional justice process following the genocide of 1994. Gacaca allowed local people to take part in the trial and resolution of genocide-related issues. At the local level, the process sought to advance justice, truth, and reconciliation. Gacaca promoted community reconciliation, helped the reintegration of those who had committed mass crimes into society, and allowed Rwandan society to confront these atrocities (Anastase, 2015).
Moreover, in 2002, the UN and the government of Sierra Leone together formed the Special Court for Sierra Leone. During the Sierra Leone civil war (1991–2002), it was assigned with the prosecution of those guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. The court maintained the principles of a fair trial while combining aspects of domestic and international law. Its efforts helped establish the groundwork for peace and stability in Sierra Leone by holding those responsible for the atrocities during the conflict accountable (Klosterboer & Hartmann-Mahmud, 2013).
In South Africa, the TRC was established in 1995 as a response to the apartheid era. It sought to promote national healing and reconciliation while addressing historical violations of human rights. Both offenders and victims had a forum to discuss their stories (truth telling). The approach placed a strong emphasis on stating the truth, making amends, and offering amnesty in exchange for complete transparency. Despite its drawbacks and critics, the TRC helped ensure a smooth transition and established the foundations for a democratic South Africa (Daudu & Dube, 2017). Rwanda also established the Gacaca Courts as a community-based transitional justice process following the genocide of 1994. Gacaca allowed local people to take part in the trial and resolution of genocide-related issues. At the local level, the process sought to advance justice, truth, and reconciliation. Gacaca promoted community reconciliation, helped the reintegration of those who had committed mass crimes into society, and allowed Rwandan society to confront these atrocities (Anastase, 2015).
Moreover, in 2002, the UN and the government of Sierra Leone together formed the Special Court for Sierra Leone. During the Sierra Leone civil war (1991–2002), it was assigned with the prosecution of those guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. The court maintained the principles of a fair trial while combining aspects of domestic and international law. Its efforts helped establish the groundwork for peace and stability in Sierra Leone by holding those responsible for the atrocities during the conflict accountable (Klosterboer & Hartmann-Mahmud, 2013).
Arnould (2019) explores different methods employed by security forces to resist transitional justice processes. She defines security forces as major actors that have the capacity to limit or stop the process of transitional justice. Although these forces may apply different methods to confront the process, worries have frequently focused on their potential for violent reactions to transitional justice. With case studies from Uganda, Sierra Leone, Brazil, and Chile, Arnould classifies these methods into six categories, which include appropriation, de-legitimation, obstructionism, disengagement, strategic cooperation and threatening violence. During the process of transitional justice, the power of security forces to hinder the process depends on their level of military, tactical, and political authority. Other factors that influence security forces’ decisions, including the type and duration of the transition, the form of civil-military cooperation, and the level of the state’s power. In addition, “the last factor that may weigh on security forces’ response to transitional justice is the nature and extent of involvement of external factors such as the United Nations, the African Union, or powerful donors in the transition process” (Arnould, 2019).
Furthermore, impunity and lack of accountability can also hinder the process. In many cases, perpetrators of war crimes and human rights violations continue to enjoy impunity due to weak judicial systems, corruption, and political interference. This undermines the trust in transitional justice processes and blocks reconciliation efforts (Sriram & Herman, 2009). As Skaar (2013) also argues, limited resources and capacity can also impede the TJ process. Post-conflict societies often face resource constraints and lack the necessary infrastructure to effectively implement transitional justice mechanisms. Insufficient funding, limited expertise, and inadequate institutional capacity pose significant challenges.
Even though transitional justice processes aim to foster reconciliation and social healing, achieving genuine reconciliation is a complex and long-term process that requires addressing the root causes of conflict, promoting dialogue, and rebuilding trust among communities. In South Africa for example, the fact that perpetrators benefited immediately from the amnesty process, while victims had to wait so long, caused much frustration (Merwe & Lamb, 2009). SIKKINK & WALLING (2007) further contend that political interference and power imbalances can undermine the independence and credibility of transitional justice mechanisms. When those in power manipulate the process to protect their interests or seek revenge against political opponents, it compromises the fairness and effectiveness of the process.
Since the King Leopold II of Belgium established the Congo Free State in 1885, the Democratic Republic the Congo has experience violent conflicts up to date. During this period, King Leopold II Exploited the Congo as his personal property until he handed it to Belgium in 1908. By then, the population of Congo was about 20 000 000 people, and around half 10 million people died as a result of forced labor and punishments form King Leopold’s brutal rule (Murhula, 2022). Belgium then colonized the Congo until 1960, when the Congo was proclaimed an independent nation through the struggles of some nationalists, Emmery Patrice Lumumba, the first Congolese prime minister emerged as a key figure in this struggle for independence and he was later assassinated in 1961. The DRC-then known as Zaire endured a brutal 32-year dictatorship under President Mobutu Sese Seko from 1965 to 1997. Since the late 1980s, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has witnessed continuous instability, characterized by civil wars and armed group clashes resulting in sexualized violence, forced displacement, and extrajudicial killings (Amnesty International, 2023).
These conflicts have been mainly caused by the colonial historical legacies, power struggles, external interference from neighboring countries, unemployment, corruption, weak institutions, and the pursuit of extensive exploitation of natural resources, such as copper, cobalt, Tin, Zinc, Lithium, Gold, Diamond, Uranium, and Manganese to the detriment of the local population (Congressional Research Service, 2022). The outbreak of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda also serves as an important factor that has caused conflicts and destabilization of this region. After the genocide which claimed the lived of 800 000+ Tutsi and moderate Hutu in Rwanda, over a million Hutus crossed the border from Rwanda to Zaire (Zaire was renamed DRC in 1997) and took refuge in eastern DRC, fearing post-genocidal reprisals. Some of them were civilians and ex-Armed Forces of Rwanda (AFR) and Interahamwe who later continued perpetrating violent acts on the Congolese territory (Murhula, 2022). These security threats in the DRC have created an environment where violence remains a daily reality for citizens in Eastern DRC, and hampered the processes of transitional justice, and unfortunately, all of these crimes and human rights abuses have remained unpunished (Mubiala, 2024).
Transitional Justice processes in the DRC date from the early 1990S, with the opening of the country’s political space resulting in the decline of Mobutu’s dictatorship in 1997 ousted by a rebel group movement led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila (Murhula, 2022). There have been several attempts to establish/maintain transitional justice mechanisms at the national and local levels with mixed results.
A variate set of TJ initiatives have been initiated in the DRC throughout the recent years both formal and informal mechanisms as in the process of addressing the long-lasting war crimes and human rights violations in the DRC’s Eastern region especially in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu provinces (Mubiala, 2024).
Established between August 1991 and November 1992, this conference aimed to build a new constitutional and political order as well as address past injustices focusing on human rights violations committed by state security services from 1965 to 1992. However, as President Mobutu was also considered as one of the perpetrators due to his dictatorial rule and plundering of the country’s resources, he suspended the TJ process, making it difficult to resort into justice and accountability (Ugwu, 2024).
This commission was formed in March March 1991 to investigate property cases, faced challenges such as underfunding and lack of collaboration, hindering its efforts to recover unjustly taken property. Though the commission presented several findings and recommendations, identifying offenders by name, it lacked judicial authority, leading to the absence of criminal prosecutions (Mubiala, 2024).
Sekhu (2024) mentions that following the 1996–1997 North Kivu armed conflict, Barza Inter-Communautaire was a local conflict resolution mechanism originated from an eastern Congolese custom. It aimed to settle ethnic conflicts, especially those involving land ownership. This conflict resolution mechanism used a traditional reconciliation procedure that engaged nine different ethnic groups: Hunde, Hutu, Kato, Kumu, Nande, Nyanga, Tembo, Tutsi, and Twa. The mechanism’s capacity to reduce ethnic tensions declined as a result of persistent conflicts in 2005.
Since 2002, Military courts have been able to try offenses under international human rights law that were committed after 1996. As many of the offenders were (and still hold) high-level positions in the army, it was challenging to prosecute high-ranking officers. Just a dozen cases involving low-level officials had gone to trial by 2008. Prosecuting those most accountable for major crimes is made extremely difficult by political meddling and corruption. The authority to try severe offenses was granted to civil courts in 2013. However, it is challenging to make any headway towards criminal accountability because many of the suspected offenders have high government posts (Mubiala, 2024).
In the Sun City Accords signed in 2003 by Congolese political and rebel group actors, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and an International Criminal Tribunal for the DRC were established. The mission of the CNVR, aimed to investigate human rights abuses, assist in the prevention and settlement of intercommunal conflicts, serve as a forum for peacebuilding, justice, and reconciliation, and promote healing and trust among Congolese. This commission faced difficulties carrying out its task because several issues, including the political composition of the CNVR, the complexity of its mandate, security barriers, a lack of funding, and poor administration (Ugwu, 2024).
In pursuit of accountability in the DRC, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue requested for the establishment International Criminal Court (ICC), which has served as one of the consistent Transitional Justice mechanisms since 2004. Since then, the prosecutor’s investigations have concentrated on alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes in North and South Kivu, Ituri, and eastern Congo. The ICC has conducted investigations and issued arrest warrants, including one for Thomas Lubanga, who was found guilty in 2012. In accordance with the DRC’s status as a State Party to the Rome Statute, the government of the DRC submitted a second request to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on May 23, 2023, under Article 14 of the Statute (Mubiala, 2024).
In line with the military tribunals established in 2002, these military courts have continued up to date and recently involved in the pursuit of justice and accountability mechanisms, applying both formal and informal mechanisms to deal with trying international crimes including war crimes and crimes against humanity in Eastern DRC. These courts have contributed to some amelioration in establishing order, justice and accountability within the security forces. However, these courts have also faced challenges including interference and the lack of independence from the other arms of government especially the executive, corruption and political interference, as well as the limitation to try officials who hold influential positions of power within the government (Ugwu, 2024).
A new law that addresses the protection and reparation of victims of sexual abuse, crimes against peace, and threats to humanity was passed in December 2022. Importantly, the country has set up two public organizations to compensate victims of serious crimes: FONAREV, the Reparations Fund for victims of sexual violence and crimes against peace and security in conflict, and FRIVAO, the Special Reparations Fund for victims of Uganda’s illegal activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). FRIVAO, which was established in May 2023, focuses on helping victims of the 2000 six-day conflict in Kisangani, which involved Ugandan military. FONAREV, on the other hand, concentrates on victims of other severe crimes that have occurred since 1993 (Ugwu, 2024).
As Ugwu (2024) and Mubiala (2024) discuss, transitional justice mechanisms in the DRC face significant challenges, particularly when the TJ processes are being attempted during a period of war. Unlike other transitional justice processes, most transitional justices are implemented after the ceasefire or when the war ends. In the DRC, however, the war is still going, with no hope that it will end anytime soon. Furthermore, the government’s alleged war supporters, who continue to hold high positions, are unable to permit a fair and sustainable TJ process due to their fear of legal prosecution. Several individuals accused of being perpetrators of gross human rights violations reportedly still occupy roles within the government and the military. The increasing impunity can be attributed to the fact that military courts in DRC have the exclusive power to handle crimes under international law.
The findings of this research underline the complexity between transitional justice (TJ) and peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The historical context of violence, marked by extensive human rights abuses and a persistent culture of impunity, poses significant challenges to the implementation of effective transitional justice mechanisms. Also, the ongoing conflict, and the presence of over 100 armed groups and persistent violence (Human Rights Watch, 2024), makes the establishment of a stable JT process to thrive. Transitional justice mechanisms, including truth commissions and reparations programs, have been attempted in the DRC; however, their effectiveness has been hindered by political instability and resource constraints. As Arnould (2019) notes, the influence of security forces can block or limit TJ initiatives, and often leads to violent opposition or strategic disengagement. In the DRC, the military’s involvement in ongoing conflicts creates a complex environment where TJ processes are not only difficult to implement but can also provoke violent reactions from people in power.
Moreover, the experiences in other post-conflict societies, such as Rwanda and South Africa, and Sierra Leon serve as an inspiration to have a supportive political climate for the success of transitional justice initiatives. In South Africa, for example, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission faced significant challenges due to the amnesty granted to perpetrators, which often left victims feeling frustrated (Merwe & Lamb, 2009). In the DRC, the lack of meaningful commitment of the government to establish a working TJ process as well as the limited community participation in TJ processes has also led to skepticism and disappointment among affected populations (Mubiala, 2024). The current transitional justice efforts in the DRC, including the establishment of the National Reparations Fund and the Inter-institutional Commission for Victim Assistance (Impunity Watch, 2024), represent positive steps forward. However, the challenge remains to build a transitional justice framework in the DRC, that not only addresses past atrocities but also promotes a culture of accountability, justice and trust in public institutions and within the local populations.
Conclusively, Transitional Justice is an important mechanism in the process of addressing war crimes and human rights violations in post-conflict societies. Considering the long-lasting war crimes and human right violations in the Democratic Republic of Congo especially in the Nord-Kivu province, there is an urgent need for effective transitional justice mechanisms to promote accountability, reconciliation, and sustainable peace in the country and in the region. The ongoing war between the Congolese government and rebel groups present a serious security threat and cause human rights violations and war crimes. Regardless of the involvement of the East African Regional Forces, the UN peacekeepers, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), this conflict keeps escalating. So far, all the attempted negotiations have not been able to find a solution to the conflict, and the existing studies have not managed to propose effective peaceful resolution mechanisms for this conflict.
This study empathizes the significance of implementing an inclusive approach to transitional justice as a catalyst for peacebuilding and conflict resolution in conflict-societies. It draws inspiration from previous TJ processes implemented in Africa especially in Sierra Leon, Rwanda and South Africa and proposes practical recommendations on how TJ can be effectively implemented to contribute to healing, peace and reconciliation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Moreover, in order to have a successful TJ process in the context of the DRC, it is important to address other root causes of conflicts which are more likely to hinder the process such as corruption, economic and social injustices and inequalities. This process also requires the government to have political will, develop adequate resources for establishing the TJ process, and the active engagement of civil society, the local populations as well as the internationally community if necessary. These collective efforts can help the DRC hope to break the long-lasting cycle of violence and enforce justice, peace, and reconciliation.
To prioritize transitional justice, ensuring that it is included and carefully considered in national policies and development plans, as an important peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms to strengthen peace and reconciliation To create a conducive environment to facilitate the implementation of JT processes. This includes promoting a culture of peace; stopping the ongoing war so that TJ processes are conducted in a way that promotes dialogue, accountability and reconciliation for both victims and perpetrators while ensuring their safety..
To keep advocating for victims and perpetrators’ participation in transitional justice initiatives, and also ensure there is justice, reparation, truth telling, reconciliation, and accountability in the TJ process.
To continue conducting awareness campaigns to educate communities about transitional justice, its objectives, and their rights, fostering greater engagement and support.
To develop and implement programs that provide psychological, social, and economic support to victims of conflict-related violence, ensuring comprehensive assistance
To advocate and mobilize international support for the transitional justice processes in the DRC..
To engage in local dialogues and community forums to discuss transitional justice and reconciliation, ensuring that community perspectives and needs are considered on the decision-making table, while also supporting and accompanying TJ processes initiatives a grass root level.
To financially support the TJ process, and enforce the corporation of other stakeholders such as the African Unions, East Africa Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to create a coordinated approach to transitional justice in the DRC.
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